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Abstract
Background: The rapid response system (RRS) is a process of accessing help for health professionals when a
patient under their care becomes severely ill. Recent studies and meta-analyses show a reduction in cardiac arrests
by a one-third in hospitals that have introduced a rapid response team, although the effect on overall hospital
mortality is less clear. It has been suggested that the difficulty in establishing the benefit of the RRS has been due
to implementation difficulties and a reluctance of clinical staff to call for additional help. This assertion is supported
by the observation that patients continue to have poor outcomes in our institution despite an established RRS
being available. In many of these cases, the patient is often unstable for many hours or days without help being
sought. These poor outcomes are often discovered in an ad hoc fashion, and the real numbers of patients who
may benefit from the RRS is currently unknown. This study has been designed to answer three key questions to
improve the RRS: estimate the scope of the problem in terms of numbers of patients requiring activation of the
RRS; determine cognitive and socio-cultural barriers to calling the Rapid Response Team; and design and
implement solutions to address the effectiveness of the RRS.
Methods: The extent of the problem will be addressed by establishing the incidence of patients who meet
abnormal physiological criteria, as determined from a point prevalence investigation conducted across four
hospitals. Follow-up review will determine if these patients subsequently require intensive care unit or critical care
intervention. This study will be grounded in both cognitive and socio-cultural theoretical frameworks. The cognitive
model of situation awareness will be used to determine psychological barriers to RRS activation, and socio-cultural
models of interprofessional practice will be triangulated to inform further investigation. A multi-modal approach
will be taken using reviews of clinical notes, structured interviews, and focus groups. Interventions will be designed
using a human factors analysis approach. Ongoing surveillance of adverse outcomes and surveys of the safety
climate in the clinical areas piloting the interventions will occur before and after implementation.
Background
Patients that become critically unwell in a hospital ward
environment commonly exhibit a recognisable period of
abnormal physiological signs before they suffer a cardiac
arrest or other catastrophic event [1-6]. It has been
established that early intervention may halt their dete-
rioration and prevent a cardiac arrest or unplanned
intensive care unit (ICU) admission. The rapid response
system (RRS) is a process whereby health professionals
can promptly access help if a patient under their care
deteriorates and before they become critically ill to pre-
vent further instability. The type of assistance varies
depending on the setting, but typically the medical
emergency team (MET) that responds consists of
trained specialist staff members such as intensivists and
senior nurses.
Many studies [7-9] and a recent meta-analysis [10]
showed that the number of cardiac arrests in hospitals
can be reduced by the introduction of a RRS. The
MERIT study [11], the only multicentre prospective
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post hoc analysis of the MERIT data of both intervention
and control hospitals, however, demonstrated early
intervention using a RRS clearly reduces in-hospital car-
diac arrests and mortality [12].
The difficulty in establishing the effectiveness of RRSs
and METs has at least in part been due to the failure of
clinical staff to call for help early in all circumstances. A
review of critical incidents in our own institution, sug-
gested that a failure to call the MET was a common fac-
tor in a large proportion of cardiac arrests and
unplanned ICU admissions [13]. The reasons behind
this failure to call for help have not previously been
investigated.
Failure to activate the RRS
In order to help health professionals to identify when a
patient is becoming physiologically unstable, specific cri-
teria based on the vital signs are often fixed for use at
the point of care. Deviation outside of these physiologi-
cal criteria such as those listed in Table 1 represent a
state where the patient is thought to be at an increased
risk of further deterioration, or has a limited reserve to
cope with additional physiological insults [1].
It is currently unclear how many patients in a routine
ward environment would meet the abnormal physiologi-
cal criteria, or if they would progress to an unstable
state and benefit from activation of the RRS. Defining
the subgroup of patients who would probably have ben-
efitted from early intervention would allow the underly-
ing factors to be more readily investigated and
addressed by redesigning of the process and more tar-
geted education for the staff.
Several barriers have already been identified in the lit-
erature that prevent the initial implementation of a RRS;
failure to view errors as a product on the system rather
than individual mistakes, lack of data that METs are life
saving, professional control issues, effective education,
and financial pressures [14]. It is possible the barriers to
ongoing effectiveness are similar, but these have not
been identified in the literature. We hypothesise that
further barriers exist to prevent the staff members call-
ing for help. These involve both the individual health
professionals’ internal cognitive processes and cultural
expectations from the clinical context and professional
identities.
Theoretical framework
As noted above, no single theory is available to describe
why, when patients meet defined criteria, that the staff
members do not activate the RRS. We will employ theo-
retical triangulation [15] using theories from the cogni-
tive engineering model of situation awareness, and
sociologically informed models of inter-professional
practice [16] to aid further investigation (Figure 1). Both
of these theories will be applied in parallel to develop a
detailed understanding of the psychosocial process of
RRS activation.
Situation awareness
Situation awareness describes the gathering and under-
standing of cues in the environment leading to a projec-
tion of the possible future consequences [17]. In the
circumstance of a deteriorating patient, each health pro-
fessional makes his or her own assessment of the situa-
tion and decides on a resultant course of action,
perhaps in consultation with colleagues. The situation
awareness model has three distinct parts: perception,
comprehension, and projection.
Perception
Perception of the vital signs of a deteriorating patient
typically means that the observations have been taken
and transposed to the observation chart. If the patient
Table 1 Medical emergency team call criteria or triggers
Airway Respiratory Distress
Threatened Airway
Breathing Respiratory Rate > 30 breaths per minute
Respiratory Rate < 6 breaths per minute
Oxygen Saturation <90% on oxygen
Circulation Blood Pressure < 90 mmHg despite treatment
Pulse Rate > 130 beats per minute
Neurology Decreased level of consciousness
Fitting
Other Concerned
Need of treatment & prompt help
Figure 1 A theoretical framework describing the cognitive and
socio-cultural barriers to calling the Medical Emergency Team
(MET)
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be repeated more frequently to ensure that a further
deterioration is not occurring and that treatment is
effective.
Comprehension
Comprehension of the meaning of the physiological
signs is also important. Specifically with the RRS, the
clinical staff must be able to recognise how the
patient’s observations relate to the triggering criteria.
A deeper level of comprehension of the patient’sp h y -
siological state may occur with more experienced staff
members. This may lead to a recollection and com-
parison to past experiences of similar cases to guide
future decision making and information gathering
[18]
Projection of future state
The ability of the health professional to project the
future course of events is determined by an understand-
ing of the current state and their previous experiences
with similar situations. The rationale given for the clini-
cal staffs’ predictions may not always be obvious, even
to them. This ‘sixth sense’ of being able to project the
future state is often the result of cues that may not be
consciously recognised [19]. One of the advantages of
the RRS is that it removes the necessity of the clinical
staff to fully understand and diagnose the problem
before asking for help. If the health professional looking
after the patient is confident they know what the clinical
p r o b l e mi s ,t h e ym a yb ea b l et ot r o u b l e s h o o tt h ep r o -
blem without requiring help. Conversely, if the health
professional is junior with only minimal experience, the
triggering criteria should trigger them to call for
assistance.
Sociological models of inter-professional practice
Even if the health professional realises the patient fulfils
the physiological criteria for activation of the RRS, there
may be socio-cultural and political barriers preventing
them from calling for help. These barriers may occur
between professional groups, within professional groups,
or as a result of a group identity existing such as within
a ward or specialty area.
Inter-professional barriers
Barriers may occur at an inter-professional level where
there are perceived to be differing levels of trust and
cooperation between professional groups [20]. The RRS
may be prevented from being activated by levels of dis-
trust between the emergency team attending and the
treating groups. Similarly, barriers may be occurring
because of the differing views and perceived role of the
RRS by nursing and medical staff.
Intra-professional barriers
Pre-existing pathways to activating the RRS may be
based in the culture of the profession [21]. It has been
established that nursing staff are more likely to activate
the RRS than medical staff [22]. This difference between
professional groups could be a result of cultural barriers
within the medical profession that have not previously
been identified.
Contextual and local cultural factors
Specific clinical areas of the institution may exhibit dif-
fering cultures about the role and function of the MET
and pathways to access help. These clinical areas are in
turn situated within the complexity of the character of
the institution itself. One of the many potential factors
that has already been identified in supporting a RRS is
whether the hospital has a teaching function [23]. Other
local cultural aspects have not been investigated, such as
the presence of implicit or explicit directions to seek
help from other sources before activating the RRS,
which may vary between clinical areas.
The experiences of individuals’ interpersonal interac-
tions during MET calls also may have a detrimental
effect on future optimal MET call behaviour amongst
staff. For example, the attitude of the MET call team on
their arrival may have a substantial effect on the culture
of the clinical area. If the team is negative and critical,
the ward staff may be reluctant to call for help on future
occasions, whereas a helpful team that supports and
educates the staff will encourage a positive attitude [24].
Aims of this study
The aims of the proposed study are threefold: to estab-
lish the scope of the problem; to examine the barriers to
calling the MET; and to pilot a redesign of the RRS to
improve its effectiveness.
Establishing the scope of the problem
First, we intend to determine the prevalence of patients
meeting the physiological criteria for activation of the
RRS at a number of hospitals. We will identify the num-
ber of patients who would have benefited from early
intervention but didn’t receive it. This will allow a
further measure to be developed: the ‘missed MET’,
which will be useful in examining the barriers to calling
the MET.
Examining the barriers to calling the MET
The reasons why the RRS was not activated by ward
staff will be determined using the theoretical framework
described in figure 1. Health professionals will be
approached from all groups involved in RRS activation,
from junior and senior medical and nursing staff, to
members of the MET themselves to ascertain the
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too late. Staff involved in successful and unsuccessful
rapid response events will be approached as well as
those involved in cases of ‘missed MET’.
Redesigning the MET system
In any knowledge translation activity, it is essential that
the end users of the knowledge are included to ensure that
the knowledge and its subsequent implementation are
relevant to their needs [25]. Once the scope and barriers
to the RRS are understood, we will pilot a redesign of the
RRS to increase its effectiveness. Evaluation of these inter-
ventions will be determined by repeat measurements from
the first two phases of the study (Figure 2).
Methods
Three related studies will be undertaken concurrently
with data collected before and after the design and
implementation of an intervention to address the issues
identified (Figure 2).
Point prevalence study
The prevalence of patients meeting the physiological cri-
teria for MET calls will be measured across four hospi-
tals of differing size and caseload over a 24-hour period.
These hospitals include an outer suburban 520 bed
acute hospital, a small 120 bed elective surgical and
oncology centre, a large metropolitan teaching hospital,
and an outer suburban community hospital. These four
hospitals comprise the majority of the acute care of a
health network with over 12,000 staff, 2,100 beds and
180,000 hospital admissions. A team of researchers will
examine the clinical notes of all adult in-patients that
are not being cared for in critical care areas (ICU, emer-
gency department, or operating theatres). The clinical
staff involved with those patients at the time the criteria
Figure 2 Overview of methods to be used
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MET call had not been made. Data collected from these
structured interviews will be used due to the time con-
straints of the study and potential to interrupt clinical
work. The interview questions will be based on the the-
oretical framework given in Figure 1. All of the patients
identified will be followed up to discharge from hospital
to determine if the rate of adverse outcomes in patients
meeting the physiological criteria. Particular note will be
made to determine if any of these patients subsequently
became critically ill, require ICU admission or a cardiac
arrest call.
This point prevalence study will be the main study
determining the scope of the problem, and to define the
‘missed MET’ for future study. The data collected from
the interviews are expected to be sketchy in terms of
determining barriers to the MET call due to the limited
time available, but may inform the direction of later
phases.
Focus groups
Knowledge translation activities require an in-depth
understanding of the context of the user-groups such as:
In what formal or informal structures is the user group
embedded? What is the political climate surrounding
the user group? To whom is the user group accounta-
ble? Are changes expected in any of these? [26]. There-
fore, focus group interviews of nursing and medical staff
will be used to examine these socio-cultural mediating
factors that may influence calling for help using the
MET system. A minimum of ten focus group interviews
will be taken from representative individuals from the
four hospitals using criterion and maximum variation
sampling [15]. Participants will be sampled by profession
(nursing and medicine) and institution (hospital), and
stratified by level of experience within the nursing and
medical professions and by institutional location. The
participants own experience of the MET call system
along with aspects of professional, local, and organisa-
tional culture will be sought.
After transcription, themes will be identified from
both the focus groups and interviews of barriers to call-
ing of the MET. The Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ) Hospital Survey on Patient Safety
Culture (HSOPSC) [27] will be completed by all the
clinical staff on the pilot wards before and at three
months after the interventions have been introduced.
Differences between the responses before and after the
intervention on the pilot wards will be analysed using a
one-way repeated measures ANOVA.
Prospective audit
Analysis of all unplanned ICU admissions and cardiac
arrests will be performed over an eight-week period
before the intervention and an eight-week period three
months following implementation of the interventions
across all four hospitals in the study.
The clinical notes of all unplanned ICU admissions
and cardiac arrests will be examined for evidence of a
‘missed MET’ in the preceding hours or days. This will
determine if an early intervention may have prevented
the patient becoming critically ill. Clinical staff involved
in the care of a patient that has a ‘missed MET’ will be
interviewed using the same structured interview used in
the point prevalence study.
The prospective audit will further allow the barriers to
the MET call to be determined from actual cases.
Furthermore, the incidence of ‘missed MET’ will be able
to be determined.
Intervention design
Adapting knowledge to the local context is a crucial
component in the knowledge translation process [25].
Up to six common barriers identified from the point
prevalence, focus group, interview, and prospective case
methods will be determined. These barriers will be pre-
sented at a workshop consisting of up to twenty clinical
staff involved in the MET call process. Case studies will
be used to illustrate how the barriers contribute to
‘missed MET’ calls, and the participants in the workshop
will be asked to provide solutions. The potential solu-
tions will then be categorised using the Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), and solu-
tions developed using the Human Factors Intervention
Matrix (HFIX) [28]. These potential solutions will be
rated in terms of feasibility, acceptability, cost effective-
ness, effectiveness, and sustainability. Up to five solu-
tions will be chosen, and be implemented as part of the
redesign process. The effects of each individual interven-
tion will not be assessed separately.
Six clinical areas will be chosen from the four hospital
sites to introduce the redesigned MET system. These six
areas will also have additional point prevalence surveys to
determine if the mechanism for dealing with the physiolo-
gically unstable patient has changed after introduction of
the new system. A further prospective audit will also be
used to assess the effectiveness of the redesigned solution.
Discussion
The care of the deteriorating patient is a priority for
most health services because it represents an area of
high clinical risk, such that there is a high likelihood of
an event occurring with the potential for a poor out-
come if a patient becomes critically ill. We hypothesise
that an effective MET system will minimise this risk by
reducing the occurrence of critical deterioration in ward
patients. Timely involvement of specialised clinicians
should prevent vital organ system collapse or cardiac
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determining how often and what ways the MET call
‘safety net’ is used by the junior and senior nursing and
medical staff members. In addition, the study will give
an insight into why clinical staff fail to call for help
when it is needed, and what cognitive or socio-cultural
factors are the overriding factors in this. Identification
of the barriers to calling for help will hopefully allow
the design of effective solutions to bypass them. These
solutions may take many forms from technological, to
process redesign, financial, education, or policy develop-
ment for the organization.
It is not clear to what extent this study may be limited
by the frequency of poor outcomes that can be directly
attributed to a failure to call for help. One of the impor-
tant aspects of this study will be to examine precisely
this rate of occurrence so the phenomenon of failure to
act when a patient becomes seriously unwell can be
more comprehensively understood.
Ultimately we hope the findings of this study will
translate to the implementation of improved systems of
care of the deteriorating patient. These in turn will
reduce the incidence of unplanned ICU admissions and
cardiac arrests and improve the survival of those that do
occur through early intervention.
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